Introduction
Emancipation and transformation are the twin goals of Participatory Action Research (PAR). Freire's concept of conscientization through 'critical reflection' is commonly recognized as central to research practice and it is often linked directly to social transformation (Gaventa, 1998, p. 153) . However, the assumption that critical reflection will automatically lead to learning and action and ultimately to social transformation is rarely questioned. Indeed, in development studies where participatory research proliferates, very little ' [ethical] reflection about the whole issue of the relationship between science and politics and power' has been observed (Tvedt, 1999, p. 144) .
The lack of development of the concept of critical reflection in PAR might be attributed to the false dichotomies between theory and practice, and the lack of clarity in the complex relationships between knowledge, action and reflection. Many writers appear to have placed implicit value on processual knowledge, asserting reflection on fieldwork as evidence of good practice (e.g. Cornwall & Jewkes, 1995; Dockery, 1996; McTaggart, 1997; Meulenberg-Buskens, 1996; Seymour-Rolls & Hughes, 1995) without questioning what exactly constitutes critical reflection or reflective practice. The concept thus appears to have been taken for granted -this is often manifested in a routinized presentation of 'lessons learnt'. This claim to learning or transformation is commonly supported by a description of events. Interpretations or analyses of these events and outcomes are often based on researchers' implicit frames of reference. Seldom are social theories drawn upon explicitly to support analysis.
In a review of literature, it appears the concept of reflection has undergone uneven development across various disciplines under the umbrella of Action Research (AR). In education, reflective practice has long been developed through the writings of Dewey, Schön, Boud, and many others, as a crucial process for improving teaching practice. This influence can also be seen recently in nursing education (e.g. Greenwood, 1993; Jarvis, 1992; Johns, 1995) and in social work (Beresford, 2001) . In particular, the critical dimension of reflective practice and its emancipatory function has been highlighted (Carr & Kemmis, 1986; Mezirow & Associates, 1990) , drawing essentially from the work of Paulo Freire (1972) . Although the interpretation of critical reflection as an unmasking of the assumptions underlying oppressive explanations of prevailing social order appears to be common among action researchers, interpretations of the 'who' and the 'how' of critical reflection are diverse.
I believe that careful consideration of critical reflection is essential for the development of good practice in PAR. This article presents my attempt to make sense of critical reflection conceptually through existing literature, as well as through my PAR practice in the context of health promotion in the UK. The first part of the article is an exploration, through writings, of the current understand-ing of the concept in general and the current forms of 'reflective practice' in PAR. It is evident from this exploration that a clear conceptual framework for reflection and crucially of critical reflection is necessary to guide reflective practice. Since PAR subscribes to a participatory worldview, such a framework needs to be grounded upon the extended epistemology espoused by Heron (1992) and since the most compelling and enduring kind of action research engages first-, secondand third-person research practice (Reason & Bradbury, 2001, p. xxvi) , such a framework needs to account for these different dimensions. In seeking to articulate the different aspects of reflective practice and their roles in the creation of different ways of knowing, I venture to propose a framework, illustrating its potential and using examples of my own reflective practice from different PAR projects. Through attending to different aspects of reflection, the notion of critical reflection can be clarified and appropriately located.
Existing ideas about reflection in AR
In AR literature, it appears that opinion over what constitutes reflection is diverse. Different writers have proposed different models to understand the concept. In education, reflection was defined by Dewey (1933, p. 9) as 'An active persistent and careful consideration of any belief or supposed form of knowledge in the light of the grounds that support it and the further conclusions to which it tends'. In other words, Dewey views reflection as a necessary component of knowledge production through experience (Pettegrew, 2000) . He suggested that reflection is often triggered when the practitioner is confronted with problematic aspects of practice and introduced five aspects of reflection in a process of thinking and problem solving: 1 intuition of solutions; 2 rationalization of difficult experience into a problem; 3 experimentation and observation of solutions; 4 mental elaboration of the supposition of an idea; and 5 testing the hypothesis by imaginative action.
The model has been criticized as individualistic, over-cognitive, and lacking attention to the emotive and dialogic aspects of reflection (Cinnamond & Zimpher, 1990) . Addressing the emotive aspect of reflection, Boud, Keogh and Walker (1985) reworked Dewey's model by simplifying the five aspects into three: (1) recalling in detail salient events; (2) attending to feelings associated with these events; and (3) evaluating and re-examining experience in the light of one's intent and existing knowledge, and incorporating this new knowledge into one's conceptual framework. By emphasizing reflection as a deliberate and conscious mental activity of the individual, Boud et al.'s model thus ignores the social, situational and dialogic aspects of reflection (Cinnamond & Zimpher, 1990) .
The contemporary development of the concept of reflection has been widely influenced by Schön. Reflective practice has become a standard curriculum in teachers' and health professionals' education programmes (Hopkins & Antes, 1990; Tate & Sills, 2004) . For Schön (1983 Schön ( , 1996 , reflective practice is not only a conscious mental activity but also an unconscious one. He distinguishes between two forms of reflection, in other words, reflection-in-action and reflection-on-action with the former as 'tacit and spontaneous and often delivered without taking thought' (Schön, 1987, p. 3) and the latter as retrospective, 'an intellectual [activity which] requires verbalisation and symbolisation ' (p. 5) . This distinction illuminates the differences between formal and informal knowledge. Knowledge gained from doing (reflection-in-action) is informal, a kind of 'artistry' developed through the dialogue of reciprocal reflection-in-action between an apprentice and his master, 'not only in words but in doing, in performance' (p. 7).
Drawing from the above perspectives, reflection can be seen as a necessary component of knowledge production through experience with different aspects: cognitive, emotive and dialogic. Different kinds of knowledge, in other words, formal and informal, are generated by different forms of reflection, in other words, reflection-on-action and reflection-in-action. Despite Schön's allusion to the dialogic aspect of reflection through the master/apprentice relationship, mental activity of the first person remains the major focus of these key contributors.
While much has been written about reflection in AR, little can be found in relation to PAR. Although there has been no explicit discussion of the genesis of the concept in PAR writings, reflection appears to be closely bound up with Freire's (1972) concept of conscientization or critical reflection which refers to a process in which the consciousness of the disadvantaged, the poor and the powerless is awakened through critical pedagogy and reflection. Conscientization has been assumed to be central to the process of learning (Blackburn & Holland, 1998) , knowledge creation (Gaventa & Cornwall, 2001) , and a source of emancipation and social transformation (Park, 2001) . However, it is often difficult to discern from any of these writings how critical reflection was actually facilitated.
It is also difficult to find critical reflection-in-action or on-action as researchers facilitate conscientization with their participants, thus many of the contradictions inherent in the theory of critical pedagogy, for example, the simple dichotomies of the oppressors and the oppressed; the polarization of popular and expert knowledge; and the colonizing connotation of 'magical consciousness' of the marginalized versus the 'critical consciousness' of the educator, have simply gone unchallenged (Dei & Sheth, 1997) . Since facilitation of conscientization often relates only to the third-person reflection, it becomes effectively
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blind to the dynamics and mutuality of the community of inquiry in which firstand second-person reflections can make significant contributions to different levels of transformation (Fisher & Torbert, 1995) . If we accept that transformation is always situated and that different forms of reflection all play a part in bringing about transformation, it is then clear that the present conceptualization of reflection is inadequate, as it not only takes for granted the different mental aspects inherent in the reflective process, but also fails to capture the complexity and the richness of the underlying processes.
Current reflective practice in PAR
Because PAR researchers draw strength from a wide range of disciplines, there is an apparent diversity in how reflections are presented. Without an explicit conceptual framework of reflection in PAR, it is often difficult to distinguish PAR writing from other forms of analytic and journalistic writings. However, the following three forms of representation and their implicit purposes can be discerned from PAR literature.
As a form of validity claim
By the very presentation of transformational experience in journals or books, these writings constitute an implicit claim to validity. However, on what basis such claims can be made is unclear. Many writers report (though do not necessary reflect) on changes effected on local communities (many examples can be found in Blackburn & Holland's [1998] book, Who changes?) with no explicit reflection upon the change processes. Even if we believe the researcher's claim, does the mere documentation of the process of change constitute a sufficient basis for such a claim? Would an evaluation of our research according to what we have accomplished be sufficient for such a claim?
Influenced by anthropology, PAR researchers may employ the techniques of 'thick description' to describe significant events so as to engage readers to participate vicariously in the experience and thus to appraise the interpretation for themselves (Winter, 1987) . However, this form of presentation of reflection often turns into a nuts-and-bolts account of experiences -describing who does what to whom without a clear indication as to how these experiences have been defined, recognized, organized and selected for presentation. Sometimes, the logics and meta-narratives presented appear to be independent of the researcher's context, rhetoric and discipline. Crucially, this form of reflection does not appear to address the central tenets of PAR, in other words, participation, empowerment (Finn, 1994) and praxis (Lather, 1986; Maguire, 1987) . Reflection on the participatory process, analysis of power dynamics and researcher reflexivity are often missing. Rarely do we discern any reflection on the relationship between theory and practice and critical awareness of the personal-political dialectic in these reports. The different criteria of validity formulated within the debate of AR, for example, interpersonal validity (Heron, 1988) ; contextual validity (Torbert, 1981) ; and catalytic validity (Lather, 1991) are increasingly accepted in the academic arena. Most recently, Reason (in press) has suggested that the quality of inquiry comes from awareness of and transparency about choices and judgements that researchers made along the four characteristic dimensions of AR: worthwhile practical purpose, democracy and participation, many ways of knowing, and emergent developmental form. However, there is little evidence that reflective practice in PAR is responding to this conceptual development.
Giving voice through reflection
Drawing on postmodernist and feminist writings that lived experiences are to be celebrated and multiple realities are to be taken seriously, some have taken the view that emancipation can be achieved by giving voice to the oppressed through honouring and narrating their experiences. Thus, many have assumed that the re-creation through representation of the participants' lived experiences will help readers' understanding of the phenomenon (Denzin, 1994) . From this vantage point, the voices of the oppressed are all important. However, it is intellectually unsatisfying to hear these voices without knowing how they were generated and encouraged in dialogues, how they were previously disrupted and silenced, and how they reveal multiple identities and social locations thus leading to the unsettling of existing power relations. Voices that are just voices have no intrinsic claim to truth (Reason, 1994) , neither do they have the practical value of informing others of how the central concerns for engagement, dialogue and pragmatic outcomes have been addressed.
Giving voice through researchers' reflections has sometimes led to the presentational dilemma experienced by researchers. For example, George (1996) , writing on behalf of her research team, recognized the significant contribution that researchers made in terms of using their own experiences to uncover the experiences of the participants. Nevertheless, she stated that they did not present the researchers' narratives in the report as they wanted to focus on the participants' experiences and wished to avoid difficulties inherent in presenting a collective experience: 'How do we responsibly report this process, this shared dialogue, such that the interactive, collaborative nature of the dialogue is represented?' (George, 1996, p. 126) .
It is, however, precisely reflection on the interactions between the researcher and the participants that is likely to illuminate how changes occur. Moreover, the part played by researchers is of great interest to other researchers. Keeping the researchers' hands hidden has the effect of systematically distorting
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the power positioning of all those who participated in the project. This only serves to misrepresent the participatory and empowerment processes that constitute essential claims to validity as discussed above.
George's dilemma highlights that the problematic in reflective practice as observed by Clegg (2004) , where the reflective self often appears to have no particular gendered, classed or racialized position. This lack of self-reflexivity can undermine the very process of reflexive engagement. The underlying emotional, social and cultural assumptions in the dialogic processes of the self and others remain unchallenged. Thus the researcher may not be aware that the presentation of voices could be framed and constructed by her own cultural assumptions and expectations.
As knowledge creation
Unlike conventional research, PAR is concerned with the creation, rather than the discovery, of knowledge or different forms of knowledge that help us relate internally to ourselves and externally to the social world. Reflection is recognized as an essential part of the knowledge generation process with actions (Rahman, 1991) . However, current reflective practice and its presentation as 'lessons learnt' might have an effect of over-simplifying the complex process of knowledge creation. For example, although Bhatt and Tandon (2001) claim that they broke the monopoly over knowledge through pedagogy with forest movements, they have presented neither the exact mechanism nor processes by which tribal people gained their new knowledge that led to collective action. Nor have they provided a broader analysis of the power relations between the State, the catalytic organization Lok Jagriti Kendra (LJK) and the tribal people. Although readers might not doubt the transformational outcomes claimed, they are uninformed about the 'how' of the critical pedagogy and other facilitation processes that brought about such transformation through reading this chapter. The mere 'documenting' of process and 'reporting' of outcomes rather than 'reflecting' on the research processes prevents the readers from gaining insights into and learning from the researchers' practice, thus missing the very aim of sharing one's research experience through writing. Coupled with the antinomy of practice and knowledge generated in the prevailing debate (Gustavsen, 1996) , the role of reflection in the knowledge and practice dialectic has thus been lost.
Re-conceptualizing reflection in PAR
It is clear from the exploration above that the concept of reflection is underdeveloped in PAR. Critical reflection is taken for granted and largely seen as third-person reflective practice -'they' rather than 'we' or 'I'. If we accept Chiu Critical reflection: more than nuts and bolts • 189
Dewey's assertion that reflection is a necessary component of knowledge production through experience, the concept of reflection then needs to take account of the dialectic relationship between reflection, knowledge and experience. In the context of the participatory world-view in which the nature of knowledge is multi-dimensional (Reason & Bradbury, 2001) , reflection in PAR is necessarily multi-perspectival, in other words, first, second and third person (Reason & Torbert, 1999) . I believe that by incorporating these perspectives into the extended epistemology developed by Heron and Reason (Heron, 1992 , 1996a , 1996b Heron & Reason, 1997) , a compelling framework can be generated. This framework can capture the complexity and multi-dimensionality of reflection, thus enabling a clearer conceptualization of the part played by critical reflection in the process of knowledge creation.
Grounding reflection in an extended epistemology is useful because it espouses the holistic being of personhood by attending to the affective, imaginal, conceptual and practical modes of human psychic functioning from which the four forms of knowing -experiential, presentational, propositional and practical -spring. These forms of knowing are arranged in a hierarchy with experiential knowing as the foundation of all the other forms -the person experiences a felt encounter, which is grasped and presented intuitively, expressed propositionally and extended into practical action. Action creates a new experience of a felt encounter and the cycle begins anew. Practical knowing is deemed to be 'the higher branching and flowering out of, and bearing fruit of the lower' (Heron, 1992, p. 20) . These forms are interdependent and dynamically and cyclically interrelated. For example, from experience of other minority ethnic women's difficulties in accessing the health services (Chiu, 2000) , I strengthen what I already know of their difficulties by sharing this knowledge with other people through narrating and presenting their stories in both verbal and written forms. However, experiential and presentational knowledge is not enough to bring about changes to their plights. I then extend my presentational knowledge by inquiring into this phenomenon through conceptualizing -reading and thinking, experiencing/ sensing and interacting, and practice/doing health promotion.
Because all other forms of knowing, in other words, presentational, propositional, and practical, are grounded on experiential knowing parented by the affective and imaginal modes of the psyche, this framework provides a space within which the participatory and relational aspects of PAR can be conceived and articulated through first-, second-and third-person reflection, thereby accounting for the dialogic and social aspects of reflection. Figure 1 illustrates the schematic representation of the proposed conceptual framework.
I venture in the following to illustrate how different forms of reflective practice can be articulated through this framework using examples from my past and current research/practice.
Action Research 4(2) Experiential reflection (experiential knowledge)
Experiential knowing refers to direct encounters with persons, places or things. 'It is knowing through participatory, empathic resonance with a being, so that as the knower, I feel both attuned with it and distinct from it' (Heron & Reason, 1997, p. 281 ). Experiential reflexivity therefore should focus on everyday lived engagement with the world, abstracting from the primordial, pre-reflective, lived experience (Merleau-Ponty, 1962) that we consider to be significant. I suggest that reflection on lived experience is an imperative as well as a necessity during and after research. In the first person, it concerns ethics and conduct of research. The researcher is motivated sometimes by the desire to solve a particular problem and/or to improve her practice. For example, in one of my projects (Chiu, 2000) , I encountered difficulties with one of the collaborators (Rosie) who threatened to withdraw her support for the project and we met to confront the problem in an atmosphere of mutual mistrust and hostility. My immediate response to this challenge was one of shock and miscomprehension. My behaviour was defensive and guarded. I could not believe my collaborator would allow anything to undermine such a 'wonderful' project as it purported to empower women in disadvantaged communities. By reflecting on events leading Chiu Critical reflection: more than nuts and bolts • 191 up to the confrontation, I recognized that my assumption that collaboration can be secured purely by virtue of the empowering principles of PAR had led me to neglect my (a lead researcher's) responsibility to build and establish collaborative relationships through mutual understanding of expectations, clear communication, empathy and continual dialogue. Rosie had been absent from her work due to a serious illness. Her return was laden with deep emotion. By attuning to the affective content of our encounter, I was able to reconnect with her and renegotiate her commitment to the project.
In the first-person perspective, reflection on experience is important to increase researchers' awareness of the situation, helping to unearth the deepest held frames that limit our responses to problems as well as our capacity to formulate strategies to move the project on. I have worked in collaboration with colleagues from different professions in the National Health Service in all the PAR projects. It is inconceivable that these projects could have gotten off the ground, let alone be implemented, without engaging with other persons. For example, my colleague Jane challenged my framing of an experience in the research process. In preparing a presentation of the project, Jane described the timidity of minority ethnic women and the restrictions that they faced in out-oftown travelling. This outraged me as I thought that she was stereotyping minority ethnic women. I was unconscious of my own professional-cultural framing of the research participants -that minority ethnic women should not be seen as weak, timid or subservient. Her insistence on presenting what she perceived as her experience and the fact that she was white had caused me to conclude that she was prejudiced. Our reflection on our own subjectivity helped to expose the contradictions that are immanent within a PAR project of this kind. When both of our assumptions were made clear, we were able to resolve this contradiction by enabling the women to present their own participatory experiences. Their presentation thus reflected cultural images that are multiple and diverse.
In the third-person perspective, at the first stage of each project, participants were invited to reflect on their own experiences with the screening services and become conscious of the lack of information about it and the poor quality of services that they experienced (Chiu, 2000) . These critical awareness-raising sessions with the disadvantaged groups that we worked with are closely based on Freire's concept of conscientization.
The presentation of these experiences helped women to voice their dissatisfaction with the treatments they received and uncovered the unethical practice of opportunistic screening in which minority ethnic women, due to their language barrier, were subjected to smear testing without being informed of its purpose and procedure (Chiu, 2000) .
Experiential reflection on the third-person level requires us not only to attune to the affective and imaginal aspects of the experiences of others, but also, as researchers, we need to grasp the conceptual (health and experiences in a social
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context) and the imaginal as a process of conscious-awareness raising, so that participants can be guided by the researcher to make sense of these experiences. In other words, while empathy and imagination are important, the conceptual mode of the researcher is required to grasp these experiences so as to facilitate conscientization with others.
Presentational reflection (presentational knowledge)
If we assume that the role of reflection is crucial to different forms of knowledge creation, presentational reflection is then important to facilitate the emergence of presentational knowledge from experience. The expression of such knowledge is through the symbolic and aesthetic media such as drawing, writing, dance and other visual or aural presentations (Heron & Reason, 1997) . I believe that our research experiences have found practical expression through visual and aural presentations on different levels.
For example, third-person presentational reflection was facilitated explicitly in the Woman to Woman (W2W) and the Straight Talking (ST) projects (Chiu, 2000 (Chiu, , 2002 . Women from participating communities were asked to reflect upon their experience of accessing the screening services and to evaluate the effectiveness of available information. They identified the lack of linguistically and culturally appropriate information about the screening procedures and services. Also, upon reflecting on the presentational deficiency of the available information, women suggested that a photo-story depicting a woman going through the screening service be produced. The photo-story is supported by a narrative recorded on audiotapes. Presenting minority ethnic women's experience using visual and aural media through their own participation in the production has not only given voice to their felt experiences of the screening services, but also given expression to their ethnic identities through languages and images (Figure 2 ).
Chiu Critical reflection: more than nuts and bolts • 193 Figure 2 Giving voice through image presentation
Recently, the value of presentational reflection in the role of creating presentational knowledge that serves practice has also been attested in our Communication for Health project (2004-present) . In this project, women from both the South Asian and Chinese communities have been involved in the production of breast screening videos. Working with professional writers and artists, women have participated in developing scripts through video and drama workshops (Figure 3) . Rigorous presentational reflections have been facilitated to create accurate presentational knowledge about women in these communities. Images that portrayed minority ethnic women having linguistic (English) and cultural deficiency have been rejected in favour of portraying a diverse community in which women are of various educational and cultural backgrounds, speaking different dialects and languages.
During the filming process, women have participated as actors, some as onset language and cultural directors. Cultural artefacts such as South Asian cooking equipment like a roti-pan and tongs, a Chinese tea-set and a scroll-painting were brought onto the sets to articulate cultural images. Participants' contributions have demonstrated their intuitive grasp of cultural presentation. It has also shown that presentational reflection requires cultural and symbolic knowledge embedded in participants (Chiu, 2005) .
In terms of second-person presentational reflection, there was no formal agreement made with producers of photo-stories and videos in relation to reflection-on-action. Although there were productive discussions, they cannot be categorized as second-person reflection. In terms of the first person, writing this article is the first time this kind of reflection has been consciously presented 'offline'. I am struck by the presentational power of women in the communities and my own capacity and enthusiasm in the creation of presentational knowledge. I have begun to explore the potential of such knowledge to give voice and form to those who have been silenced and made invisible by dominant health promotion practice.
Critical reflection (propositional knowledge)
The knowledge 'about' does not come from direct sensory perception or experience, but is mediated by intellectual processes of concept forming and conceptual organization, analysis, inferences and synthesis; and in which reflectivity plays a crucial part. In the PAR paradigm, critical reflection that generates propositional knowledge cannot be divorced from the other three forms of reflection. Although this form appears to be privileged and most developed in academic discourse in general, there appears to be ambivalence or confusion towards the creation of propositional knowledge.
The philosophical tradition of critical theory that derives from Kant, Marx, and the Frankfurt School is congruent with the philosophical groundings of PAR, where critical propositional knowledge is differentiated from positivistic knowledge of cause and effect through its orientation to self-reflection and emancipation (Bohman, 2002) . Understanding that is generated is pragmatic and multi-perspectival (Brandom, 1994; Bohman, 2003) and located within situational, institutional, cultural, and historical contexts (Bourdieu, 1991) .
In the first person, this aspect of critical reflection is concerned with, on the one hand, the reflexivity of the researcher; self-questioning to unearth the cultural frame from which we understand or make sense of our own actions and interactions, and on the other, in-depth analysis of research encounters using theoretical resources after researchers temporarily or permanently withdraw from the field. Mezirow's notion of 'critical reflection ' (1990) as the uncovering of the embedded social and cultural assumptions and presuppositions of one's beliefs can be suitably located and developed in the former. In the latter, critical reflection will likely generate quality propositional knowledge about the social world by turning the researcher's gaze back onto themselves and examining the hidden assumptions that structure their research (Bourdieu & Wacquant, 1992) .
In the second person, critical reflection concerned specifically with the power relations between participants, and those between participants and researchers, examines how these relations are structured in the institutional and societal context and shaped by ideologies that support them. In the third person, critical reflection refers to the facilitation of Freire's notion of collective critical reflection among participants. All the above aspects of critical reflection take Chiu Critical reflection: more than nuts and bolts • 195 experiences as content, and explicit critical theories as lenses through which reflections can be focussed. It is where double confrontations of theory and data take place (Winter, 1987) . The following examples of the use of critical theories to make sense of my encounters are taken from the W2W project (Chiu, 2000) .
The different perspectives on the problem of low uptake of the screening services held by health professionals and minority ethnic women were understood through the uncovering of imbalanced social and power relations using black feminist theories, for example, Aziz, 1994; Bhavnani, 1993 and Brah, 1992 . The resulting analysis rejected the normative explanation that uptakes are caused by language and cultural deficits on the part of minority ethnic women and reframed it as a symptom of the routinized professional practice perpetuated through colonial ideologies and racialized practice. The issue of uptake was then reframed as an issue of access, shifting the responsibility for improving service accessibility for minority ethnic women back to the health professionals. The power relations between participants were manifested in conflicts that arose between professionals and bilingual minority ethnic women who were recruited and trained as Community Health Educators (CHEs) to promote access to services. The existence of CHEs brought about a crisis of 'expert' authority among the health professionals as their legitimacy and capacity in health education were challenged. As I withdrew from the field, the transformation process was better understood by drawing on Bourdieu's theory of practice and the concepts of 'habitus' and 'field' (Bourdieu, 1977) .
Bourdieu suggests that cultural resources, practices and institutions function to maintain unequal social relations. Attempting to transcend the dualist and dichotomous thinking of western culture, Bourdieu integrates the concepts of agency and structure, subjectivity and objectivity, the micro and the macro, and voluntarist and determinist antinomy, by conceptualizing these into a single conceptual movement. He proposes a structural theory of practice that connects action to culture, structure and power. He views the actor as a practical strategist embedded in the social structure through the concept of habitus, which is defined as 'A system of durable, transposable dispositions, which functions as the generative basis of structured, objectively unified practices' (Bourdieu, 1990 (Bourdieu, [1979 , quoted in Harker, Mahar & Wilkes, 1990, p. 10) .
The concept of habitus stresses the deterministic, cognitive and embodied characteristics of the actor, who possesses a disposition, created and reformulated through the conjuncture of objective structures and personal history. S/he is the product of particular social conditions, but is not determined by them. Bourdieu asserts that individuals and groups draw upon a variety of cultural, social and symbolic resources in order to maintain and enhance their positions in the social order. Cultural capital is defined by Bourdieu as a wide variety of resources including verbal facility, general cultural awareness, aesthetic preferences, information about the social system and educational credentials. Cultural capital is an
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individual's power resource. For Bourdieu, the theory of change describes the social action produced at the intersection of habitus and field. Field is defined as a set of structured relations that has its own specific logic or rules that guide practice. In the context of this article, health services can be defined as a social field.
Bourdieu's concepts of habitus and field have not only provided lenses through which the issue of ethnic identities in post-colonial social relations and the contradictions of professional practice in complex institutional organizations such as the National Health Service can be better understood, but also strategic insights into what changes could be made through the contestation and legitimization of knowledge production (Chiu, 2000) . Part of the strategy for transformation of practice was through the use of Bourdieu's concepts of symbolic and cultural power by which bi-lingual minority ethnic women were encouraged to exploit their own linguistic skills and cultural knowledge, so as to take control of the production of health education resources and materials that support their health promotion work, for example, the photo-stories, packs and educational resources mentioned above.
First-person critical reflection is similar to the methodological stance of reflexivity advocated by Bourdieu's sociology (Bourdieu & Wacquant, 1992) . However, putting the self back into critical reflection is more than situating and historicizing a scholarly viewpoint -it is central to the development of knowledge and the professional practice of the researcher. In facilitating transformation, there is an ever-present danger in challenging dominant ideology. Putting oneself at personal and professional risk can be depressing, frightening and demoralizing. Critical theory is a resource for unearthing and exploring complex questions and contradictions that may be found in specific situations in practice. For example, it has helped me to understand the constraints imposed by structural forces and thus avoid anxiety and self-laceration when confronted with a myriad of problems that had no immediate solutions.
In one of my first-person critical reflective moments, I recognized that it was through the intuitive grasp of my own ethnic identity (bi-lingual British Chinese) and social and cultural position (as a health promotion practitioner and researcher) that the mobilization of symbolic and cultural power for the struggle had been made possible. This embodied knowledge by its very nature was implicit and personal. Thus only through critical reflection on significant transformational events does such knowledge become propositional, explicit and transferable. My hope is that writing about this will help others to become aware of the use of symbolic and cultural power in health promotion practice whatever their ethnic identity. reflecting upon their work by using simple storytelling methods as well as the use of more structured reflective tools adopted from Williams and Harris (2001) . Although these meetings provide rich developmental data for evaluation, the intention is to skill-up participants to practice reflection on their own. So far, the effectiveness of this aspect of reflection remains unexplored.
Concluding thoughts
PAR is often characterised as third-person inquiry with critical reflection seen as central to social transformation. However, the concept appears to have been taken for granted and reflections of the first and second persons are seldom considered. My experience has taught me that a successful PAR project requires the integration of all three. It is clear that the present reflective practice in PAR does not seem to align with the concept's overall development in AR.
As Reason (2003, p. 119) has rightly pointed out 'part of our task as action researchers is to re-describe inquiry'. Rather than becoming caught in the takenfor-granted dualism that underlines much of the orthodox research, we need to fashion our own language to describe our inquiry. When PAR writers communicate with the wider world about their research experience, we are precisely creating and sharing our knowledge with others.
We need to question our own taken-for-granted concepts, in other words, critical reflection and conscientization, and seek to re-describe them, so that they become useful in our research/practice. If we assert that our work is based on different forms of knowing that go beyond the conventional western epistemology, and our research validity and quality is enhanced by the engagement with self, persons and communities (Reason, 2003) , grounding reflection practice on an extended epistemology (Heron, 1992 (Heron, , 1996a , then taking account of first-, second-and third-person reflections seems a logical starting point.
I have in this article ventured to outline a reflective practice framework and illustrated how different forms of reflection emerge by attending to the generation of different ways of knowing from different personal perspectives. Critical reflexivity hereby finds its expressions through self-reflexivity, relational-reflexivity and collective-reflexivity in the generation of propositional knowing. The power of such reflexivity will be increased through the use of critical theories in the unearthing of our embedded assumptions and beliefs, as well as in our understanding of how relationships are socially structured and related to the wider social and political context. This kind of propositional knowing will then contribute to strategies for transformation and praxis. This framework is useful, I believe, for it aligns with the extended epistemology and the participatory worldview, in which the integration of first-, second-and third-person perspectives is possible. Improving first-person reflexivity improves our PAR practice, through thinking, doing and facilitating change, with not just our rationality but our intuition and creativity. From the second-person perspective, the challenge is to improve our conversations and interconnectedness with others, while reflexivity from the third-person perspective highlights the need for deepening social and political analysis that contributes to strategies for social change.
So, I come to the end of my reflective journey about critical reflection in PAR and my re-description of the concept based on my own research experience. I hope this re-description will be of some use and that it will help us to develop our reflective practice mindfully, imaginatively and courageously.
